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1 Introduction 
The paper discusses the intended versus realised implications of the Digital North Denmark IT 
program, DDN. The analysis is partial in the sense that is focused on whether and how the program 
may have long-term consequences for the development perspectives for the regional Information and 
Communications Technology industries (ICT).  
DDN was a regional IT program running 2000-2003 in North Jutland County in Denmark with na-
tional government support of € 23 million. The Danish government initiated the program with the aim 
of further strengthening regions with an already proven ICT capability (Dybkjær and Lindegaard, 
1999, p.96-100). The declared approach was to build on the existing competencies in industry as well 
as at universities. The national government chose two regions – Ørestaden, a new concentration of 
knowledge-based institutions near Copenhagen Airport, and North Jutland. The Copenhagen pro-
gram was basically concentrated on, literally, construction of a new IT University, a new neighbouring 
science park and a new media centre for the public broadcaster, Danmarks Radio. DDN was, on the 
other hand, organised as a large-scale experiment based on project-offers within four themes. The 
code words were to create a ‘network society and a ‘learning region’ – i.e. a much wider level of ambi-
tions, but also a more loose kind of wording, with a certain amount of ‘hot air’ involved. The partici-
pants - meant to be project consortia of ideally private firms, public or private organisations as well as 
regional and municipal government bodies - could get a maximum national government support of 
one third of the total project sum. 
The point of departure of the paper is the theories of regional innovation policy based on localised 
change and user-producer interaction. Innovation policy is public action aimed to influence technical 
change and other kinds of innovation (Edquist, 2001). An ICT policy program is ‘localised’, if it is tar-
geted to create incremental change in a region. It aims to reproduce and strengthen existing structures, 
but does not necessarily imply following deterministic trajectories, since unpredictable changes may 
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occur (Dosi et al., 1988; Boschma, 2004). Likewise is new variety mainly directed and channelled by 
the existing environment. The challenge is to support the (positive) development path of the regional 
production system, while avoiding technological and institutional lock-in. It is not sufficient only to 
learn, but also important to unlearn at the firm as well as at the policymaker level (Lorenzen, 2001). 
The literature on innovation systems emphasizes interaction between different organisations as crucial 
in learning processes that lead to innovation. User-producer interaction is important to avoid unsatis-
factory innovation (Lundvall, 1985; Lundvall, 1992; Edquist, 1997; Lundvall, 2002). Regional policies 
on localised change require willingness to learn as well as unlearn and to keep a ‘double focus’ on 
both users and producers. Regional policies have tended to focus mostly on either one of these, which 
has reduced the chance of success. 
The North Jutland region was chosen as ‘IT-lighthouse’ due to several reasons. It was considered to 
have a great ICT potential; it was well known for network cooperation between firms, university, sci-
ence park and public organizations; it had experienced a process of structural change from being a 
crisis area in the 1980s to an ICT growth area in the 1990s and it was home of a successful international 
visible wireless communication cluster, NorCOM. The local university was considered to have been 
an important actor in the transformation process of the region and was intended to become a key 
player in building the ‘IT lighthouse’. The region had since the 1980s been supported several EU pro-
grams and the county administration had proved to be quite experienced in organizing support pro-
grams based on project offers. The proven capability of cooperation between private and public organ-
izations, the wireless cluster firms and the university were considered as key features. 
However, during the implementation of the program this profile was significantly changed. The 
wireless cluster firms and the university were largely missing as participants and some of the large 
projects revealed a lack of cooperation between firms and public organizations. Dramatic external 
events also influenced the results. DDN was presented in 1999, when the ICT sector was booming, but 
implemented from late 2000, when the ICT crisis had begun.  
The paper analyses the design and implementation of DDN with focus on the actors, their involve-
ment and change of interest over time as well as the current results of the program. The discussion 
will focus on the duality between incremental and radical change in the rhetoric of the programme 
versus what has been realised so far. The paper contains in section two a discussion of our theoretical 
approach to the analysis of the effects of public innovation policy. Section three presents an analysis of 
the structural change in North Jutland in the 1990s with an emphasis on the ICT sector. Section four 
analyses the history of DDN and the shaping of its final profile, while section five deals with the actu-
al implementation. The results of DDN and its influence on the development perspectives of the ICT 
sector in North Jutland are presented in section six with a discussion of the large projects on digital 
TV, e-business and IT infrastructure. Finally, the conclusions are presented in the last section. 
2 Incremental versus radical change in regional innovation policy 
A variety of regional polices have in recent years been used as tools for development of peripheral 
regions in Europe. The role of regional policy and its effectiveness has been debated in the literature 
(see e.g. Cooke, 2001; Lorenzen, 2001). One of the main issues is whether it is at all possible to create 
more fundamental change in the development trajectory of a region through public policy or whether 
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the only realistic aim for policies is to improve existing structures and avoid lock-in, as stated by 
Edquist (1999):  
“..’lock-in’ failures imply a role for policy in adapting to shifts in new technologies and de-
mand. This means that a key issue is the choice between supporting existing systems (with 
their historically accumulated learning and knowledge bases) and supporting the develop-
ment of radically new technologies and supporting systems” (Edquist,1999, p.17)  
Innovation is a complex phenomenon, embracing products, processes and services. It includes 
technological as well as organisational innovations (Edquist, 1999). Innovation is a pervasive phenom-
enon, which penetrates all aspects of economic life, and is a result of on-going processes of learning, 
searching and exploring (Lundvall 1992).  
Radical innovation is major change that represents a new technological paradigm. Radical change 
implies that the codes developed to communicate a cumulatively changing technology will become 
inadequate (Rogers, 1995). The producers that follow a given trajectory will have problems under-
standing and evaluating the potentials of the new paradigm (Lundvall, 1992, p. 58). Radical change 
creates a high degree of uncertainty in organisations and industry. It also sweeps away significant 
parts of previous investments in technical skills and knowledge, designs, production techniques, 
plants and equipment (Utterback, 1994, p. 200). The change is not necessarily delimited to the supply 
side. It may come from a change at the demand side and in the organisational or institutional struc-
ture. Incremental innovation, on the other hand, is gradual and cumulative. Incremental innovations 
are only small changes in technology, organisations, processes, products or services.  
Boschma (2004) distinguishes between two ideal types of aims for regional policy: ‘localised’ versus 
‘structural’ change. Localised change is following the development trajectory based on the existing 
structure in the region. The change is location-specific and determined by the past, which define the 
limits. It is incremental and cumulative and reproduces and strengthens existing structures. The (posi-
tive) cumulative change and path dependence may, however, result in a lock-in, which at a later stage 
may produce negative effects. When a region is facing technological and institutional lock-in, it be-
comes vulnerable to external changes in the economy. 
Each region has according to Maskell et al. (1998) a set of capabilities that consist of the institutional 
background, the structure of industry, natural resources, knowledge and skills. These have been de-
veloped through a historical interactive process. Further evolution relies on the creation, utilisation 
and reproduction of knowledge. Public and private organisations in the region are interconnected and 
interact. The organisations effect the regions through localisation and through creation and demand of 
skills and knowledge. But the organisations are also outcomes of the existing structure and institu-
tions in the region (Storper, 1997). New variety is thus mainly directed and channelled by the existing 
environment. Localised change is cumulative and path dependent, but not deterministic and predict-
able, and bound to end in a lock-in situation (Boschma, 2004).  
Structural change is more dramatic. It is based on technological, organisational and institutional 
transformation and relies on creative destruction (Boschma, 2004). It implies a shift of the regional 
development trajectory. A lot of uncertainty is related to the structural change. The outcome is less 
predictable. The element of chance is high, since small historical events may be reinforced by agglom-
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eration economics and spinoffs. Such processes are well known from the studies of regional industrial 
clusters (Krugman, 1991; Porter, 1998; Klepper, 2001). But, as argued by Boschma (2004), the speed of 
change is not necessarily high. Structural change is not immediate, but new trajectories emerge and 
develop gradually. Structural change points at transformation of the industrial structure of a region. 
But new trajectories develop gradually or incrementally in most cases. It could be expected that many 
incremental changes may accumulate a structural change over time.  
The goal of policy programs can target ‘long-run’ structural change or focus on localised change. 
This distinction is, however, often blurred in reality – i.e. behind the rhetoric of the program declara-
tions. The notions of incremental versus radical innovation are easier to distinguish and to make oper-
ational. A policy program based on experiments can exemplify this. When initiating a program, it is 
possible for the policy makers to outline a goal and set a frame for the experiments. If it is based on 
project offers, as the DDN program turned out to be, the outcome is partly defined by the applicants. 
The policy makers can set some requirements in the tender material and carry out selection among the 
applications. This makes the potential outcome of the program uncertain. The individual projects also 
have a higher degree of uncertainty, and some are likely to fail. Variety is created in the regional sys-
tem since the organisations are involved in different search strategies. A localised policy program 
based on firm-level experimenting would contain some projects focused on incremental and others on 
radical change. The latter are novel and could introduce new technologies or consumption patterns 
etc. Some of these could change the development trajectory for parts of the region and, over time, lead 
to a structural change. 
If we look at policies for structural change there is a difference between national and regional poli-
cies. At the national level polices are associated with creating new industries (becoming first mover) 
or catching up, and usually not directed towards specific regions. Public procurement appears to have 
been the most successful (Lundvall, 1992; Edquist, 1997; Edquist, 2001). That instrument can also be 
effective at regional level, where a boost from public demand or a clear expression of will/support can 
reduce uncertainty related to innovation. The effect is of course not known ex ante, since the evolution 
is still uncertain. But as argued by e.g. Mowery and Nelson (1999), there have been successes as well 
as failures in public policies targeting radical changes in industry structure.  
Regional innovation policies are sensitive to the regional endowment, trajectories and context. Lo-
calised polices should take regional variety as a point of departure, and be based on a bottom-up 
strategy attuned to the regions needs and resources (Maskell et al., 1998; Cooke, 2001; Boschma, 2004).  
3 The North Jutland region – from lagging behind to catching up 
The North Jutland County is located at the northern tip of the peninsula of Jutland, the part of 
Denmark connected to the European continent. The population is around half a million people, slight-
ly less than one tenth of the Danish total. Total employment was 246,500 persons in 1999, of which the 
private sector share was 163,500. The largest municipality is Aalborg, the fourth largest city in Den-
mark, with 163,000 inhabitants. The region has traditionally been characterized as peripheral and lag-
ging behind with an unemployment rate among the highest in Denmark. The industry structure has 
been dominated by more traditional industries, such as agriculture and food processing, fishery, tour-
ism, shipyards, textiles, tobacco and cement. However, during the late 1980s and the 1990s the region 
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has experienced a process of structural change with jobs moving from the traditional sectors to the 
service and the high-tech sectors. Although the firms in North Jutland are still specialized in the pri-
mary sector (i.e. an above national average employment share) and the metal product industry, they 
are also specialized in especially mechanical engineering as well as in electronics. The latter has been 
among the features, which indicates that the region has caught up. The industry structure is at present 
in line with the average Danish ‘non-metropolitan’ counties. The two ‘metropolitan’ regions are the 
greater Copenhagen area and Aarhus. The region has undergone a structural change, but still has 
structural problems, and has an above average unemployment rate and a below average income com-
pared to the Danish average (Dalum et al., 2002, p.9-10).  
Aalborg University (AAU) plays an important role in North Jutland. It was established in 1974 and 
has today 13,000 students and 1,700 employees in Humanities, Engineering, Natural Sciences and 
Social Sciences. AAU was until 2000 the one of only two universities in Denmark that offered the 
M.Sc. in engineering (5 years) and in the 1990s approximately fifty percent of the Danish M.Sc.’s in 
engineering graduated from AAU. From its establishment AAU has been very active in cooperation 
with private firms and it participates in many networks and joint research projects (Dahl, 2003). Al-
most 40% of the total number of graduates from the university got their first job in the region. (Nielsen 
et al., 2002, p. 81). 
The region has from 1986 been supported with several EU Programs due to the crisis in North Jut-
land especially in fishing, shipbuilding from the last half of the 1980s and the structural problems with 
a high unemployment rate1. Especially the Objective 2 funds for Industrial Reconversion have been 
used to promote the structural change in the region2. In the period 1986-1999 the region was support-
ed with € 210 million from the EU, which generated additionally € 247 million in support from Danish 
public organizations and € 302 million from private firms. In comparison the DDN program was fi-
nanced by € 23 million in public support and the current Objective 2 EU program running 2000-2006 
has received € 246 million in public support. The evaluation reports indicate that the overall effect of 
the EU programs has been positive for the region, but due to their fragmented nature, the direct effect 
in terms of employment and indirect effects e.g. creation of networks is difficult to measure3. The di-
rect effect of DDN is expected to be smaller than Objective 2. The North Jutland County administra-
tion has been the administrator for the EU programs i.e. organizing the project offers, putting together 
the financing, attracting external partners etc. Through this work the County Administration has built 
up competencies, which were useful in the DDN program and created a wide network to the different 
participating actors.  
3.1 The ICT sector in North Jutland before the DDN program 
The ICT sector in North Jutland had experienced high growth during the 1990s. Employment grew 
with 63.5% from 1992 to 1999 compared with a growth of 33.7% at the national level. Total ICT em-
                                                          
1 From 1980-1992 the average unemployment rate in North Jutland was 2.5-3 percentage points higher than the national average 
(Ministry of Industry, 1994). 
2 The programs have been quite broad in their objects e.g. the Objective 2 program for Industrial Reconversion has supported 
projects with physical investments in private companies, knowledge building projects in private companies, knowledge build-
ing projects with soft framework conditions, infrastructure, education in firms and education with soft framework conditions. 
3 http://www.nja.dk/serviceomraader/erhvervogarbejdsmarked/euprogrammer/resultaterafnordjyskeeuprogrammer.htm 
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ployment4 was 8,300 in 1999, but the region has however not been specialized in ICT employment. 
The specialization indicator increased from 0.7 to 0.8 during the period. The region has been catching 
up from a rather low level. The structure of the ICT sector in North Jutland is different from the over-
all Danish structure, since 45% of the employment was in manufacturing compared to 25% for Den-
mark.  
Specialization in ICT manufacturing increased during the 1990s from 1.05 to 1.5 concentrated on 
two segments, telecommunications equipment and electronic components. Table 1 reveals that espe-
cially telecom hardware has been outstanding with an increase from a three to nearly six times larger 
employment share compared to the national average. Denmark was internationally specialized in 
exports in manufacturing of telecommunication equipment.  
Table 1 The structure of the ICT sector in North Jutland  
  North Jutland  Denmark 
  
Specializa-
tion 
Employ-
ploy-
ment 
(persons) 
Share of 
ICT  
(percent) 
Development 
1992-99 
(1992=100) 
Change 
(persons) 
Share of 
ICT 
(percent) 
Development 
1992-99 
(1992=100) 
Export 
speciali-
zation 
(1998) 
  
  1992 1999 
Manufacturing 1.05 1.51 3,731 44.9 150.3 1,248 25.3 104.3 0.52 
Office machinery 4.33 6.81 288 3.5 116.1 40 0.4 73.7 0.15 
Computers 0.70 0.36 52 0.6 48.1 -56 1.5 94.4 0.41 
Electronic components and wire 1.55 1.14 511 6.2 81.2 -118 4.6 110.2 0.21 
Telecommunications equipment 3.13 5.92 1,936 23.3 207.3 1,002 3.4 109.5 1.14 
Consumer electronics 0.27 0.89 467 5.6 392.4 348 5.4 120.1 0.78 
Electro medical  0.48 0.42 193 2.3 84.3 -36 4.7 95.5 1.70 
Instruments etc. 0.41 0.55 284 3.4 131.5 68 5.3 98.1 0.94 
Services 0.53 0.63 4,573 55.1 176.2 1,978 74.7 147.7 - 
Wholesale trade 0.33 0.35 846 10.2 137.6 231 24.5 127.9 - 
Telecommunications 0.62 0.99 1,777 21.4 200.8 892 18.4 125.2 - 
IT services & software 0.67 0.63 1,950 23.5 178.1 855 31.9 190.1 - 
Total ICT sector 0.70 0.85 8,304 100 163.5 3,226 100 133.7 - 
Note: A positive change in employment or specialisation above 1 is marked in bold. Instruments etc. are instruments and 
equipment for detecting, measuring, checking and controlling physical phenomena or processes. The export specialization is 
based on trade by commodities statistics for OECD (23).  
Source: Statistics Denmark and OECD (2000) International Trade by Commodities Statistics, No. 1. 
The region has not been specialized in ICT services where specialization only increased from ap-
proximately 0.5 to 0.6 1992-99. The employment in ICT services grew 76% in the period compared 
with 48% at national level, but this segment is still rather weak in North Jutland. The ICT service con-
sists of three parts: Wholesale, Telecommunication service, and IT service & software. The latter is the 
largest segment in Denmark and North Jutland. It contains most of the new IT firms of the 1990s, but 
despite of a high employment growth the specialization in North Jutland declined from 0.67 to 0.63. 
However in telecom services the region was at the national average, which otherwise was concentrat-
ed in the two ’metropolitan’ regions. The ICT sector has a tendency to concentrate around the large 
cities, including Aalborg, and in particular, the ‘metropolitan’ regions of Aarhus and the Copenhagen 
area (Dalum et al., 2002). 
                                                          
4 The ICT sector is defined as NACE/DB93: 3001, 3002, 3130, 3210, 3220, 3230, 331020, 331030, 331090, 3320, 3300, 514320, 
516410, 516520, 6420, 713310, 72 
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A special feature of the ICT sector in North Jutland is the presence of a wireless communication 
cluster mainly consisting of firms working with mobile communication equipment and equipment for 
maritime communication and navigation. In 1999 the cluster consisted of 30 firms, which employed 
more than 40% of the employees in the ICT sector and a large share of these were related to R&D ac-
tivities (for a detailed analyses of the development of the cluster see Dalum et al., 2002; Dahl et al., 
2003). The cluster had grown out of a few maritime communication firms from the late 1970s and had 
in the 1990s experienced high growth. It attracted many subsidiaries of large multinational companies. 
The cluster is thus an important part of the entire ICT sector and it also attracted a lot of attention at 
national level due to its success and international profile.  
4 The history of DDN and the shaping of the profile 
The early formation of DDN program, until the first project offer in June 2000, can be divided into 
the invitation from the government and the response from the region. The concept behind DDN was 
changed considerably within a period of six months.  
4.1 Why North Denmark? The ministers invitation and The Digital Denmark 
report 
At the 25 year anniversary of Aalborg University in September 1999 the Minister of Research and 
Information Technology invited the region of North Jutland to build an ‘IT Lighthouse’. The program 
was a part of the government’s ICT strategy on ‘The Digital Denmark’.  
The strategy was further described in a report in November 1999 from the ministry “The Digital 
Denmark – conversion to the network society” on how Denmark should evolve from an information socie-
ty into a network society (Dybkjær and Lindegaard, 1999). One of the policy measures to achieve the 
goal was the creation of two IT lighthouses: one in Copenhagen and one in North Jutland. While the 
program in Copenhagen was focusing on creating infrastructure the DDN program was to be an ex-
periment (Dybkjær and Lindegaard, 1999, p. 90-93). The rhetoric was very ambitious about creating 
international visible IT lighthouses that should be a ‘cornerstone’ of the network society, and ‘light up 
and show the way’ for the rest of Denmark. They were inspired by international ICT growth areas, 
and believed that focused public policy had played an important role in the development of these. The 
purpose of DDN was to strengthen and further develop the strong growth in the ICT sector from the 
1990s.  
“An IT lighthouse should be established in Northern Jutland on the basis of the very posi-
tive co-operation which has already been established between enterprises, Aalborg Universi-
ty, Northern Jutland’s Science Park (Nordjyllands Videnpark – NOVI) and central politi-
cal decision makers in the area.” (Dybkjær and Lindegaard, 1999, p.90) 
The government wanted to build an IT lighthouse, but did not define directly what it was. A clear 
description of an IT lighthouse cannot be found in the background report for the policy program. Alt-
hough the rhetoric of the report makes parallels to Silicon Valley, Kista and Oulu it would be wrong to 
conclude that they intended to create radical change by building a new Danish Silicon Valley. But it 
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seems clear that they wanted to support incremental change of the existing strengths in the ICT sector 
i.e. the wireless communications cluster. The goal of incremental change is also supported by their 
argument of building on the existing network cooperation between public and private organizations. 
“The purpose of a large-scale experiment in Northern Jutland, an IT lighthouse, is to pro-
mote development in an area which has already shown that it contains great IT potential, 
with private enterprises, Aalborg University and NOVI as driving forces. The large-scale 
experiment should promote IT development and IT use and, via concrete projects, kick-start 
life into the network society. The concrete projects should reinforce the electronics infra-
structure, competence development, e-commerce, efficiency and service in the public sector, 
the democratic dialogue and opportunities for the individual citizen to exploit the potential 
of the network society.” (Dybkjær and Lindegaard, 1999, p.91) 
The Minister stressed, when giving the invitation in September 1999, that it was required that the 
public organizations, the university and private firms cooperated on designing a program and build-
ing the IT Lighthouse.  
“In a large-scale experiment, Northern Jutland could be Denmark’s first IT lighthouse via 
the activities which have already been commenced and via a number of prioritised initia-
tives which should be formulated in partnership between the Government, decision-makers 
in Northern Jutland and the private enterprises in the area” (Dybkjær and Lindegaard, 
1999, p.91) 
Given that the proposal was presented at the university anniversary it was a common belief at least 
among the university employees that the program would get a strong research profile based on joint 
research projects with private firms. The fear was that the DDN project would be used to support 
many fragmented small projects like a traditional development programs for less favoured regions.  
4.2 The response from the region 
In September 1999 it was believed that a quick response was needed to show that North Jutland 
was able to fulfil the task. The county administration established a regional interim board consisting 
of the county mayor, the mayor of the municipality of Aalborg, the mayor of the municipality of 
Hjørring, the rector of Aalborg University and representatives from the Danish Trade Union Con-
gress, the Confederation of Danish Industries and the Danish Employers' Confederation.  
After six weeks the result was a report on why North Jutland should be an ICT lighthouse, a vision 
of how it should be build and a roadmap for the further work. The vision for North Jutland consisted 
of ten points (The North Jutland County, 1999, p.36-38, www.detdigitalenordjylland.dk): 
 North Jutland should become a learning region  
 North Jutland should have a strong and coherent educational system that is in the front in 
Denmark 
 North Jutland should have high level research within IT 
 North Jutland should have education and continuing education for the future worker  
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 North Jutland should have a strong service industry 
 North Jutland should have leading development and sales firms within IT 
 In North Jutland all citizens should have direct or indirect access to a computer and the In-
ternet 
 In North Jutland use of e-business and e-services should be widespread among the citizens 
 North Jutland should provide good framework conditions for private firms.  
 North Jutland should have a public sector that is the most open in Denmark with good ser-
vice accessible 24 hours a day 
Almost every ‘political correct’ goal was included. The bullet points did not express any clear selec-
tion or choice. The list included both objects of radical and incremental change, and even some points 
that already was fulfilled (e.g. leading development and sales firms within IT). However a new focus 
on improving the efficiency and quality of the public sector had been included. The effectiveness in 
the private sector was also stressed. 
By fulfilling the 10 points it was believed that the productivity in the private and public sector 
would increase. The rationale was that the technological development would not result in rationaliza-
tion and increase in productivity in itself, without a joint effort with education and organizational 
development. IT was not considered a goal, but as a mean to build the lighthouse. To create positive 
synergies it was stated that the forthcoming experiments should be large and comprehensive in order 
to ‘make a difference’. The selected experiments should be able to reach and be important for a large 
proportion of the citizens of North Jutland (The North Jutland County, 1999, p.42).  
It was specified that an important part of the vision was North Jutland as a learning region. There 
was however no clear definition of this concept, although the keywords were ability and will among 
citizens, firms and other organizations to change, renew, innovate, learn, cooperate and to build new 
capabilities, networks and supporting institutions (The North Jutland County, 1999)5. These are the 
principles underlying structural change, but the means were of an incremental nature. The profile of 
DDN had thus begun to change from having a focus on research, industrial development of the ICT 
sector and networks between university and firms to become broadly user-orientated with a wider 
purpose of IT education, application and diffusion. 
The DDN organization should consist of a board of directors with the responsibility to select the 
themes of the program in cooperation with the ministry. It should also appoint6: 
 The project groups connected to each theme 
 The board of executives with the responsibility of the practical implementation 
 The project groups with the responsibility to select the winning projects 
 A secretariat with responsibility of all the practical work.  
                                                          
5 Dybkjær and Lindegaard (1999, 2000) do not use the term learning region. 
6 In addition they wanted to nominate an independent participatory research group consisting of university researchers to carry 
out research in relation to the DDN. The present authors are members of this group. 
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The interim board of directors was almost identical in the new DDN organization. The editors of 
the report7 were to be a part of the board of executives (The North Jutland County, 1999, p. 48). The 
board of directors included a wide selection of interest groups to secure a broad acceptance in the 
region, especially among the municipalities. The specific selection of actors in the two boards strongly 
influenced the DDN profile.  
The wireless communications cluster and the university had almost not been included in the plans 
for DDN8, but the building of the lighthouse could still offer opportunities for these actors.  
5 Building the lighthouse 
The discussions of the Digital North Jutland became intensified after the region’s response in No-
vember 1999. In the report it was stated that the final profile still could be changed. As a result various 
ideas of the implementation of the program flourished. The report on DDN had described a roadmap 
for the building of the lighthouse. The board of directors should decide upon four themes and the 
profile and then appoint four project groups to select the projects. DDN was organised as project of-
fers within the four themes.  
Three different profiles were competing for dominance in the large-scale experiment (see also 
Bruun, 2001):  
1. The industry innovation orientated profile that stressed the importance of industrial devel-
opment through innovation and cooperation with the university.  
2. The research-orientated profile that had a point of departure in the university research pro-
jects with industry  
3. The user-orientated that focused on extensive use of IT. 
5.1 The planning phase and the final program 
The board of directors was officially appointed in February 2000. Their first task was to specify the 
four themes further and appointment of the four projects groups. But this work had already begun 
previously. During December and January the themes were specified and enrolment of actors to the 
project groups and mobilization of actors to create ideas and projects had begun.  
The director of the Lighthouse Secretariat joined the board after her appointment in the spring 2000. 
The board thus included a wide selection of groups to secure a broad acceptance of the program and 
to mobilize as many actors as possible. The selection was, however, dominated by political and organ-
isational interests, and the interest of the ICT industries was given low priority.  
The profile was, however, not definitely decided upon in mid-January. The heads of the county and 
the university administrations, both members of from the board of executives expressed opposing 
views publicly. They admitted that the ‘fight’ could be whether the money should be used broadly for 
IT experiments for the population of North Jutland or more narrowly in targeted research. The head of 
                                                          
7 The editors were the clerk to the county council and the university director. 
8 In the report had the phrases of ‘development of the ICT sector’ and networks with the university’ been toned down. 
 11 
the university administration also argued that the funds should be used to increase the present high 
level of the ICT sector while the head of the county administration argued that the funds should only 
be invested in projects with a (short-run) return9. 
In January 2000 the four themes were selected10: 
 IT infrastructure 
 IT industrial development 
 Qualification and Education 
 Digital Administration 
A project group was attached to each theme which should participate in the selection of winning 
projects from the forthcoming project offers. Their first task was to work on a project strategy and 
frame. Based on these each group should select the best projects, and the board of directors would 
afterwards appoint the winners. A professor from the university was selected as chairman for the first 
theme. A managing director from a private firm was selected for group two, a chief executive from a 
municipality for theme three and a director from the county administration became chairman for 
theme four. The four groups consisted of up to nine members and had a strong influence of public 
organizations. The groups worked in April-June on the description of the four themes in the project 
offers.  
In February 2000 the Ministry of Research and Information Technology approved the DDN pro-
gram. Although no project offers had been held, the work continued on the sidelines. In mid-February 
several forthcoming DDN projects appeared in the media11. The head of the county administration 
argued e.g. for a project that included a PC for all the public sector employees in North Jutland. This 
idea was, however, never turned into a specified proposal.  
The DDN secretariat was also established in spring 2000 and a head of the secretariat was hired, 
with a background in Humanistic Informatics from the Aalborg municipality administration12. She 
represented the broad user-orientated profile of DDN that became dominant. The appointment also 
clearly indicated the direction of DDN. The profile had been changed from the original idea described 
in the Dybkjær and Lindegaard (1999) report and in the minister’s speech in September 1999. The pro-
file was not specified to build on the existing industrial and research strength in region, but to broad-
en the use of IT to lift the entire region and create a learning region. The project should not focus on 
one sector but all sectors and not concentrate on one problem or area, but ‘cover it all’ (The Lighthouse 
Secretariat, 2000, p. 5).  
The allocation of funds to the four themes in the first round of project offers also underlines the us-
er-orientated profile13: 
                                                          
9 Thorhauge, Claus “Nordjysk IT fyrtårn leder efter ideer” Computerworld 14/1 2000 
10 The names of the themes are a bit different in January, but they are covering the same areas: Infrastructure, E-business and 
technological framework conditions, IT in the public sector, and Qualification and Education.  
11 Special supplement to Computerworld 28/2-2000 
12 The core themes in the human informatics education are that of building competencies among the users and the construction 
of user-friendly systems (Bruun, 2001).  
13 Of the total project sum on € 23 million were € 21 million allocated to projects, whereas the rest were to cover administration, 
participatory research and evaluation. Approximately 50% of the funds were to be spent in the first project offer. 
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 IT infrastructure received € 2 million 
 IT industrial development € 2 million 
 Qualification and Education € 4 million 
 Digital Administration € 2.7 million.  
5.2 How the university was put on the sideline and the missing participation of 
the wireless cluster firms 
In spring 2000 the Ministry of Finance decided that the national government should not pay more 
than the 1/3 of the total project sum. This meant special rules for public financed organizations and 
organizations who wanted to use EU objective 2 funds for the DDN projects. As a result the university 
could not use regular funds or let the employees participate in the project as a part of the 2/3 of the 
funding that had to be self provided. To participate the university had to use external funding for the 
projects or let the potential project partners pay the total funding. It was believed by many university 
people that this put an end to university participation in DDN projects and clearly influenced its pro-
file.  
The funding rules did stop many project ideas, but the university still managed to become partner 
in some projects through special arrangements. But DDN did not become as research-orientated as the 
university believed it should have been. Analysis of the timing of events and processes however indi-
cate that the user-orientated profile of DDN already was determined, and that the university was put 
on the sideline before the ministry decided on the rules for funding. Researchers from AAU partici-
pated in 15 % of the DDN projects (The Lighthouse Secretariat, 2003). In terms of university research 
groups the participation had moved away from the more technical disciplines to the more ‘soft’ re-
search fields. 
The missing participation of the wireless communications cluster firms became evident during the 
project offers. They only participated in 6 of the total 90 DDN projects. The main participants were the 
service provider Sonofon and L.M. Ericsson, while other cluster firms only participated in two small 
projects. There were no representatives from the cluster or the ICT sector in the regional interim board 
of directors who wrote the initial DDN report. Later on a member from the cluster was included in the 
board of directors, but as a representative for the local Confederation of Danish Industries.  
The DDN profile did clearly not encourage the cluster firms to participate. IT infrastructure theme 
was focused on the fixed network and the IT industrial theme was mainly looking at e-business. Why 
the cluster only was sparsely involved in shaping the DDN profile is still unclear. But it could be relat-
ed to the boom in the industry in 1999-2000. The main problems within the cluster were the increasing 
wages and the lack of qualified labour. The cluster firms had plenty of projects with a higher priority 
than DDN. However, before the first round of project offers the cluster association arranged meetings 
to mobilize members to participate in the DDN program. The cluster association wanted to secure that 
the DDN policy program did not become a failure that could have negative reputation effects for the 
region.  
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Although only six DDN projects had participation by cluster firms there was a group of projects 
that included mobile e-business and diffusion of the mobile phone platform to various industries. 
These areas were in the periphery of the focus of the wireless communications firms. 
5.3 What determined the broad user–oriented DDN profile 
Bruun (2001) analysed the initiation and the first steps of implementation of DDN as a process. He 
described five determinants in shaping of the broad user-orientated profile: 
 Strong commitment from the leadership of influential public organizations 
 The composition of the DDN organization 
 Formal mode of operation 
 Ministry rules for funding 
 Appointment of the director of the lighthouse secretariat  
These five factors were not mutually independent. It seems that the strong commitment from the 
leadership of influential public organizations lead to the broad user-orientated profile. The ministry 
rules for funding have weakened the ‘university preferred’ research-orientated interpretation, but it 
seems as if the user-orientated profile already dominated when the ministry issued the rules. The ap-
pointment of the director of the lighthouse secretariat with a profile that supported the user-driven 
DDN interpretation is more a consequence and underlining of the already selected DDN profile14.  
A possible determinant is somehow missing in the list. The ICT sector was booming and there was 
a widespread fear that the public sector was lagging behind. The solution to this problem could be to 
diffuse ICT broadly in society and to upgrade the use of ICT in the local public administration and 
other public organizations. This fear combined with the strong commitment from the public sector 
and the exclusion of representatives from the ICT sector seems to have outlined the final DDN profile. 
5.4 The winning DDN projects and the shift from radical to incremental change  
Many of the first round projects in Autumn 2000 were ‘high profiled’, i.e. large projects with many 
participants and high ambitions. They were mainly focusing on radical change. The enrolment of 
many public organizations had clearly created a bulk of applications since they needed to participate, 
but also other organizations felt that they had to be a part of DDN due to the commercial value and to 
avoid that the program became a failure. The prestige attached to DDN also attracted participants. 
The DDN secretariat received 118 project-application and 44 projects were selected as winners in 
the first round (The Lighthouse Secretariat, 2001). The € 11 million in support generated a total project 
sum of € 50 million15. The distribution was: 
 The IT infrastructure theme received 10 applications, 4 winners was selected. 
 IT industrial development received 33 applications and 12 winners. 
                                                          
14 The director had been involved in the writing of the initial report, but it is unclear to what extent, see Bruun (2001). 
15 The funding given to each theme varied slightly from the expected amount, in this paper the expected amounts are noted. 
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 Digital Administration received 24 applications and 7 winners. 
 Qualification and Education received 51 projects applications and 21 winners.  
The aims of the projects were very diverse and could be characterized as let a thousand flowers 
bloom. Among the high profile and ambitious projects were: 
 The Digital County Administration and The Open Municipality on digitalizing the county 
administration and the administrative procedures in the municipalities. 
 North Jutland Netforum planning an optical fibre based infrastructure (‘fibre to the home’). 
 TV2 Nord Digital broadcasting digital TV with interactive services among the first in Eu-
rope. 
 Personal Mobilized Broadband Services using front line technology and creating and test-
ing the future home mobile broadband services. 
 The Digital Mall which should be the electronic shopping site on the Internet preferred by 
citizens of North Jutland . 
 E-business between private companies and the North Jutland county administration, a full 
scale e-business solution . 
 Digital Villages in North Denmark, an effort to maintain and develop the rural districts as 
vital enterprising and viable local communities and to attract new inhabitants to the villag-
es.  
Many of the ‘high profile’ projects later on had to adjust their goals and change methods to com-
plete the projects, e.g. since they couldn’t get the necessary equipment and when they got it, it 
couldn’t do what it was supposed to. The international crisis in the ICT sector also had a major influ-
ence because it fundamentally changed the beliefs on what was possible and what not. 
In the later rounds of project offers the winning projects were more focused and specific than the 
first projects i.e. more focused on incremental than radical change. The themes were more specifies in 
the following projects offers (The Lighthouse Secretariat, 2002): 
 Qualification and Education with a focus on democracy, children and young persons, and 
adults with weak IT competencies in the spring 2001 (€ 3.6 million). 
 Digital Administration with a focus on the healthcare system in the summer 2001 (€ 3.4 mil-
lion). 
 IT industrial development with a focus on competitiveness in small and medium sized 
firms in the summer 2001 (€ 2.4 million). 
 Qualification and Education with a focus on art, culture and IT in the network society in 
early 2002 (€ 0.9 million).  
But although the themes in the later projects offers became more coherent and the type of projects 
changed it doesn’t change the basic picture of DDN as a very wide range of projects.  
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Due to the large variety in the projects it is hard to compare the success rate of the first round pro-
jects with the other rounds to see if the more focused projects were more or less successful than the 
‘high profile’ projects. The latter were however focused on radical change. The projects on digitalizing 
the county administration or the hospitals sector could potentially have a huge effect on the public 
sector and could, when completed, be a success factor for DDN. Also projects on creating the Digital 
Mall, broadcasting interactive Digital TV and planning (and building) a fibre based infrastructure for 
the entire North Jutland can be important parts in making DDN a success. Especially the latter project 
on planning fibres to the home would - if implemented - make the IT infrastructure in North Jutland 
the most advanced in Denmark and in most of Europe. This would create a visible and lasting effect of 
DDN.  
6 The development perspectives for the ICT sector and the results of 
DDN 
In this section we focus on the results of DDN so far with special emphasis on the development per-
spectives for the ICT industries and some of the ‘high profiled’ projects on digital TV, a digital mall 
and the IT infrastructure. DDN generated 90 winner projects with a total sum of € 90 million, which 
was considerable more than the expected minimum sum on € 64 million, i.e. the government funding 
of the projects was on average less than ¼ (The Lighthouse Secretariat, 2003). The projects were initi-
ated during 2000-2002 and have been finishing continuously until end of 2003.  
On the positive side the DDN program created lots of ideas, initiated many projects and represent-
ed a large commercial value for the region for a rather modest government support compared to the 
objective 2 funds. The interviews performed reveal that the program seems to have created networks 
between firms and public organization that may contribute positively to the development perspectives 
for the ICT sector in North Jutland. There were some success stories of small local IT service firms who 
benefited from the program, and many projects where participation has been considered positive.  
ICT firms participated in many of the 90 projects, e.g. as project partners or suppliers of software 
services and hardware. The influence of DDN on the development perspectives of the ICT sector in 
North Jutland is blurred, since the ICT firms participated in different ways and not all of the partici-
pants were located in North Jutland. Participation was not restricted to the North Jutland region. It is 
also important to distinguish between ICT firms that participated as suppliers of standard software 
and hardware and firms that developed software and services that were more specific towards the 
project. The latter group could experience a competence enhancement and externalities that could 
affect the development perspectives more positively than the pecuniary effect on sales. The project 
descriptions reveals that ICT firms were participating in more than 40 projects, but the scope of the 
projects are varying and the level of competence building in these firms are not possible to assess 
without more thorough analysis that is beyond the scope of this paper. The analysis in this section will 
focus on the interaction between the ICT sector and the large DDN project on IT infrastructure, Digital 
TV and The Digital Mall. 
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6.1 The development of the ICT sector in the early phase of DDN 
DDN was planned when the ICT sector was booming, but when the first round of project offers was 
initiated, the dot.com bubble burst and the ICT sector went from boom to crisis. However, it took al-
most a year before the crisis hit the mobile communications industry. In spite of the crisis, the em-
ployment in the ICT sector in North Jutland grew 1.7% (143 persons) during 1999–2001. But the 
growth rate was considerably lower compared to the average annual growth rates of 6.3% in 1992-
1999. Table 2 reveals that the ICT sector in North Jutland performed worse than the national average, 
which had a considerable higher growth rate in 1999-2001 on 6.5%. The ICT sector in North Jutland 
seems to have lost momentum and the specialization declined marginally from 0.85 to 0.82. The over-
all increase in ICT employment during the crisis might seem surprising, but the numbers hide an in-
crease in 2000 and a decrease in 200116.  
Table 2 The development of the ICT sector in North Jutland 1999-2001  
  North Jutland  Denmark 
  
Specialization 
Employ-
ploy-
ment 
(persons) 
Share of 
ICT  
(percent) 
Development 
1999-01 
(1999=100) 
Change 
(persons) 
Share of 
ICT 
(percent) 
Development 
1999-01 
(1999=100) 
  
  1999 2001 
Manufacturing 1.51 1.10 2,512 29.7 67.3 -1,219 22.4 94.2 
Office machinery 6.81 0.25 2 0 0.7 -286 0.0 19.0 
Computers 0.36 0.46 60 0.7 115.4 8 1.3 89.8 
Electronic components and wire 1.14 1.44 468 5.5 91.6 -43 3.2 73.4 
Telecommunications equipment 5.92 4.81 1,211 14.3 62.6 -725 2.5 77.9 
Consumer electronics 0.89 0.63 322 3.8 69.0 -145 5.0 98.0 
Electro medical  0.42 0.41 189 2.2 97.9 -4 4.5 101.0 
Instruments etc. 0.55 0.43 260 3.1 91.5 -24 5.9 119.8 
Services 0.63 0.74 5,935 70.3 129.8 1,362 77.6 110.6 
Wholesale trade 0.35 0.44 937 11.1 110.8 91 20.9 90.7 
Telecommunications 0.99 0.92 1,747 20.7 98.3 -30 18.6 107.5 
IT services & software 0.63 0.83 3,251 38.5 166.7 1,301 38.2 127.7 
Total ICT sector 0.85 0.82 8,447 100 101.7 143 100 106.5 
Note: A positive change in employment or specialisation above 1 is marked in bold. Instruments etc. are instruments and 
equipment for detecting, measuring, checking and controlling physical phenomena or processes.  
Source: Statistics Denmark  
The picture of an increase in employment in 2000 and a drop in 2001 is a bit more blurred at the 
more detailed level; some of the segments, such as telecommunications equipment, were shrinking in 
2000 as well as in 2001. Manufacturing of ICT experienced a drop in employment, whereas the service 
segment experienced high growth. This trend was most outspoken in North Jutland where manufac-
turing dropped with almost 33% and services grew with nearly 30%. North Jutland was however still 
specialized in manufacturing (1.10).  
The total employment in the mobile communications cluster was almost stable with a small decline, 
although the cluster experienced a turbulent period with high entry and exit (COWI, 2002; Dahl et al., 
2003). This turbulence might explain some of the shift in employment from manufacturing of tele-
communications equipment to IT services & software, since the new firms could have been ‘mis-
                                                          
16 The employment data for 2002 are not yet available from Statistics Denmark 
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placed’ in NACE activity codes related to the IT services & software. The development in this segment 
has been very positive with an increase in employment of 66.7% (1,300 persons). North Jutland is not 
specialized in this segment, but had an increasing specialization indicator from 0.63 to 0.83.  
The employment performance of the entire ICT sector during the beginning of DDN was worse 
than the national average and slower than the pre-DDN period. The latter part of this can be explained 
by the crisis in the ICT sector, but why the ICT sector in North Jutland has performed relatively worse 
is harder to explain. DDN can be said to have been a success, since the strongly represented segment 
in the program, IT services & software, had a high growth. Both these interpretations of the data are 
still quite speculative and uncertain due to the timing of the DDN projects, the crisis and the data. A 
possible positive employment effect can hardly be seen in the 2001 data, since most of the projects 
started during 2001 and early 2002. The possible employment effect would probably reveal itself as a 
lesser decrease in employment instead of an increase because a decline may be expected for the sector 
at the national level.  
6.2 The cases of Digital TV, The Digital Mall and IT infrastructure 
The projects on Digital TV and the Digital Mall were two winning projects in the first round. Both 
can be characterized as being ‘high profiled’ and ambitious. The Digital TV project intended to trans-
mit digital TV with interactive services among the first in Europe. The Digital Mall should be the elec-
tronic shopping site on the Internet preferred by citizens of North Jutland. The IT infrastructure pro-
ject wanted to design local optical fibre based network solutions, which would bring ‘true broadband’ 
to local government organisations as well as to private firms and consumers. These large projects 
could have had a larger and more visible impact on the region than the many diverse smaller DDN 
projects. They clearly contained elements of radical change from the outset.  
6.2.1 Digital TV17 
 In 2001 the local affiliate in Northern Denmark of a national public service TV broadcaster, TV2 
Nord, founded a new company with the purpose to begin broadcasting terrestrial digital TV. It had 
been accepted and supported with € 0.8 million, which was less than 1/6 of the total amount of the 
project, which also received support from the European Objective 2 funds. There were several part-
ners, such as a TV station, which should supply the employees, a large bank interested in the possibili-
ties for e-commerce via digital TV, a science park that wanted to support the local activities in the 
digital TV industry, the local municipality and several content providers. The project was planned to 
begin in early 2001 and the first broadcasting in late 2001. Terrestrial digital TV was known from other 
parts of Europe, but not with transmission of enhanced content or other interactive services based on 
the open Multimedia Home Platform (MHP) standard. Terrestrial digital TV consists of video, audio 
and enhanced content, but the combination of the three is the challenging part.  
In the early phase the development of applications for games, betting, e-business and home-
banking etc. was given a lower priority. Instead the focus was on creating enhanced content. They 
found that the promised technical possibilities in digital TV are many and widespread, but there were 
also many limitations in the MHP standard and the existing equipment. Especially the set-top box 
                                                          
17 Based on Pedersen and Dalum (2003b) and on interviews with participants in the project. 
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that, connected to the TV, allow the user to receive the digital TV. Although the project progressed 
fairly slowly, it attracted a lot of attention from other TV stations, whereas interest from the large 
equipment manufactures was sparse.  
A panel group has tested digital TV with enhanced content for six months and a new group has re-
ceived digital TV with interactivity (backward link through a modem) and a small hard disk. The re-
sults of the first round of test are still being processed, but the first preliminary results show that the 
users have been more positive than expected, in spite of some technical errors and omissions. TV2 
Nord Digital has been running many tests on their systems and has subsequently gained a lot of expe-
rience in building and running a digital TV station. It is running fully digitalised and in the evenings it 
is unmanned and controlled by an employee working from home on a laptop18. Many foreign TV sta-
tions have visited TV 2 Nord Digital to gain inspiration and advise. The TV station has also begun 
some consultancy business. The broadcasting equipment was not supplied by the big equipment 
manufactures, but compiled from many smaller suppliers combined with own solutions. It was possi-
ble to buy a complete system from the big equipment manufactures, but the price was too high. The 
test of equipment has also attracted some manufactures and some degree of cooperation has taken 
place. 
The project has been a success and has applied for an extension of the test period. The TV station 
has also been rather active in cooperation with Danish hardware manufactures regarding the set-top 
box and has been trying to get the university involved in research related to digital TV, which seems 
to have happened on the content side.  
The experiment in North Denmark cannot create competitiveness for the local industry in itself, but 
can provide some guidelines for the companies, especially if the Danish government had decided on a 
full-scale implementation of digital TV. Since the two major TV stations in Denmark are public service 
channels financed at least partly by license fees, an ambitious plan for a fast transition from analog to 
digital TV could have created some interesting perspectives on the role of advanced demand and so-
cial experimentation. However, the Danish government decided in 2003 upon a less ambitious plan, 
which may undermine the entire experiment in North Denmark, especially if they are not allowed to 
continue the transmission after the test period.  
Denmark is likely to have lost the opportunity to become first mover or even to among the first, alt-
hough the diffusion of digital TV has been slow all over Europe. Although the project has turned out 
to be a success in terms of technology and users, the future of the project is still highly uncertain due 
to the missing boost in demand caused by the slow transition from analog to digital TV in Denmark. 
6.2.2 The Digital Mall19 
The Digital Mall was a DDN project with a mobile communications service provider, a regional 
bank, a logistics company, a supermarket chain, and a software company. The mall was intended to 
attract ‘Business-to-Consumer’ (B2C), ‘Business-to-Business’ (B2B) in the industrial sector and to be 
the site where the national government organisations, county and municipalities would undertake 
their purchases.  
                                                          
18 The live transmission is supplied from the ‘mother’ TV station. 
19 Based on Pedersen and Dalum (2003a) and on interviews with participants. 
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The Digital Mall was developed with a focus on North Denmark but later the concept could be ex-
tended to the remaining country. The philosophy was: Think big and keep expanding your market 
continuously - with a focus on a future use of the Mobile Internet. It was planned to enable mobile 
access and mobile payment. The main idea was to create a common portal where different shops were 
collected. To overcome some of the problems with e-commerce, such as trust, payment, return policy 
etc., they wanted a single standard payment system and common return system. They also wanted a 
common complaint procedure. The idea was to signal that e-commerce is simple, the partners and the 
payment system could be trusted upon and if anything went wrong the return policy was shared and 
easy. They wanted well-known brands and high security. 
The project however ended shortly after the start, basically because a ‘focus group’ approach based 
series of interviews with potential customers clearly indicated that consumers were not willing to pay 
the extra costs for the new services. One of the problems is that the revenue on groceries is quite low 
since the market is very competitive and although the potential customers would like to use the Digi-
tal Mall and also pay extra for the service, the expected revenue was not sufficient to make the project 
profitable. Other problems were related to creating a high volume to cover the marketing costs, which 
did not seem possible in the short run without a combined effort in the region from both public and 
private organizations. 
The volume of the project was too small to be commercially viable, and it seems that a boost from a 
large supermarket chain or the public sector is necessary to carry out a complete e-business solution 
like the Digital Mall, since a chicken-and-egg situation emerges with the costumers waiting for many 
shops and goods on the site before buying, and the shops are waiting for the demand before joining 
the e-business site. The county administration was considering joining the project or using the e-
business solution, but decided to build a separate e-business solution as a part of the Digital County 
Administration. A group of municipalities including the large municipality of Aalborg also decided to 
create separate e-business solutions as a part of DDN. If these projects had merged it could maybe 
have been possible to create a commercial sustainable digital mall, since the joined effort could have 
created a large volume and a lot of publicity, but cooperation, a common will and vision were not 
established to the necessary extent.  
6.2.3 The IT infrastructure20 
North Jutland Netforum and KMD Netbroker were had the purpose to plan the long term IT in-
frastructure in North Jutland and initiate the building of an IT infrastructure based on optical fibres21.  
The rapid technological development in the optical fibre industry combined with falling prices has 
made fibres direct to the home a real alternative as an Internet connection. Optical communication 
(transmission with light signals) has usually only been used in the Internet and telecommunications 
backbone, but the increasing demand for data capacity, i.e. speed in the network for the ordinary us-
ers, has made it clear that the best development path in Internet connections is to pull an optical fiber 
cable directly to each home. The broadband connections can also be used to transmit digital TV sig-
                                                          
20 Based on Pedersen and Dalum (2003a), Dalum et al (2002) and on interviews with participants in the project. 
21 Netforum of North Denmark is an independent organization established in cooperation between Aalborg University, a bank, 
the County of North Jutland, the municipality of Aalborg and an IT firm. The KMD Netbroker is a commercial organization 
established as part of KMD A/S in collaboration with the municipalities of Brønderslev, Hals, Frederikshavn and Sæby. 
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nals. Sweden has been among the lead countries in the use of fibres direct to the home. In Denmark 
the construction of an optical fibre network has been delayed because of the lack of political support 
and commitment. The idea is to design an optimal network according to the existing infrastructure, 
households, firms and public organisations and coordinate the digging to an overall plan, when firms 
are laying down cables, sewers etc.  
The information infrastructure should be regarded to be as important as the more traditional physi-
cal infrastructure, such as roads and power. This standpoint has however not been shared by the pub-
lic authorities. As a result has the planning of the information infrastructure been uncoordinated and 
uncontrolled. This lack of coordination is creating a significant waste of resources since nobody knows 
who are laying down fibres, when and where. The price of laying down the cables is mainly deter-
mined by digging costs. With an empty plastic tube it is possible to lay down extra fibres when the 
capacity is needed, without digging, since the cable can be ‘blown’ through the empty tube. Especially 
in the cities, the digging is very expensive. By planning an optimal infrastructure and coordinate the 
digging activities it is possible to build a complete fibre network at an affordable reasonable price. The 
coordination requirement is that whenever telecommunication firms, power plants, district heating 
firms, public sewer service etc. are digging, there should be put down empty tubes as well.22 By plan-
ning the IT infrastructure with the goal of connecting every household23 in Denmark with optical fi-
bres, the combined demand will drive down prices on each connection and also allow for households 
and firms in the rural districts to get a true broadband connections.  
To fulfil this plan it is necessary to get public and private organizations to cooperate and coordi-
nate. The public sector is especially important to boost the project, to coordinate and also decide that 
this is the vision for the future IT infrastructure and to join the plan. DDN began the planning process 
for three small rural municipalities and has subsequently been trying to expand the planning, but the 
project has been suffering from a lack of cooperation between firms and public organizations. Several 
municipalities in North Jutland County are trying to create an initiative to expand the planning and 
initiate the building of IT infrastructure, but need a more committed the backing from the county au-
thorities. 
In the three-year period the project has been running many actors have been interested in entering 
the market for broadband Internet connections. Especially the power suppliers have been interested in 
entering and in North Western Zealand in Denmark the power supplier has begun offering optical 
fibres direct to the home to its customers24. At present they only offer fibres to customers in the cities 
and only in neighbourhoods with a sufficient number of interested customers. They are building a 
network consisting of several local city networks combined with a larger backbone. The customers can 
choose between several subscriptions depending of the services they want, such as Internet, telephony 
and TV. The former monopoly service provider TDC is planning optical fibre Internet connections to 
the most of the Funen County or at least the easiest accessible areas including the third largest city in 
Denmark, Odense. The price for each connection is however several times higher than the calculated 
price of each connection in the DDN project.  
                                                          
22 See also http://www.nordjysknetforum.dk/ 
23 Using other technologies like Fixed Wireless Access (FWA) could connect the most isolated household. 
24 http://www.nve.dk 
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While the North Jutland County has been very slow to react, Danish counties especially Viborg and 
South Jutland County have been faster. In cooperation with North Denmark Netforum, they have 
created similar organisation, Western Denmark Netforum, with a wider geographical scope. The 
counties have already begun making the initial preparations to begin planning of the future IT infra-
structure, such as collecting information on the existing IT infrastructure and putting down empty 
tubes, whenever digging.  
The DDN infrastructure project opened unique opportunities of creating field experiments with an 
optical fiber based local infrastructure that also contains extensive possibilities for a combination with 
other technologies. One of the derived effects of the project is the foundation of a Centre for Tele In-
frastructure (CTIF) at Aalborg University joining the research competencies within the wireless tech-
nologies with research in the wired infrastructure (Dalum et al., 2002). The DDN project also opened 
unique opportunities for planning and building the best IT infrastructure in Denmark, but other re-
gions are catching up and even forging ahead. The County of North Jutland seems at present to have 
missed the opportunity of becoming a ‘lead user’ in this field. 
6.3 The future of DDN  
DDN was running from 2000 to 2003 and the last projects have been finalized in the spring of 2004. 
The project has not been officially evaluated yet. There are at present no announced plans to continue 
the large-scale experiment after the end of financial support from the government. The original DDN 
report stressed the necessity that the experiment not just faded away after the end of financial support. 
To avoid this it appeared necessary to collect the experiences by a continuous documentation of the 
results (The North Jutland County, 1999, p.48).  
However, from the beginning of the DDN project period in late 2000 the expectations have appar-
ently been that the program would end with an evaluation. This lack of a future vision could be the 
result of many years’ of structural problems as a peripheral region and reliance on outside financial 
support. This could be due to a kind of ‘clientism-mood’ in the region, where one financial support 
program currently has been substituted by the next. DDN could then have been conceived to be yet 
another program that was going to bring money and activity to the region. A possible rationale for a 
region that previously suffered from this kind of ‘clientism’ could have been to use the money to cre-
ate some activity, hope that the positive experiences would remain in the region, evaluate the program 
and sit back and wait for next support program. Such an interpretation appears exaggerated in the 
DDN case. The ‘clientism-mood’ of the region is on its way out, but has apparently not disappeared 
sufficiently yet. 
A group of public organizations formed in early 2003 a think-tank named North Jutland Innovation 
Forum to evaluate and create initiatives related to the future development of the region. It is, however, 
not evident that this forum in reality has the political momentum to carry on the positive initiatives 
created by DDN. The vision described by a group of managers from the ICT sector and university 
researchers in January 2002 (NOVI, 2002) on a continuation of the DDN program after 2003 by making 
North Jutland a large-scale field experiment has not really been adopted in the region.  
 22 
7 Conclusion 
From the outset, the original government vision of DDN appeared to have been a radical change of 
North Jutland towards a ‘network society’. But the means proposed – although they were never clear-
ly formulated - appear to have been rather incremental in terms of building on what was already 
achieved in the region, which undoubtedly referred the progress of the wireless communications clus-
ter during the 1990s. The means were conceived as a ‘localised’ policy program focusing on incremen-
tal change. Apart from all the rhetoric and ‘hot air’ on the transformation to a network society and a 
learning region, the main purpose was to build on the existing strong capabilities of the ICT sector.  
In North Jutland the wireless communication cluster was an important part of the ICT sector, but 
these firms were not successfully mobilized in DDN. The university was only partially integrated in 
the program. It played an active role in DDN, but the technical research groups that probably are the 
most important for a major part of the ICT sector have not been active in to any significant extent in 
DDN.  
The profile became broadly user-orientated as a result of a deliberate strategy among the dominant 
actors at the very early stage of the program. The strong commitment from the leadership of influen-
tial public organizations and the missing representatives from private ICT firms lead to the final pro-
file. On the other hand the industry side could, perhaps, be blamed for not being sufficiently active in 
this process. The strong growth in mobile communications industry – up until 2001 - was likely to 
make them less interested in participation. The business opportunities were plenty at the time. 
The goals of DDN were multiple and somehow lost focus. It could be characterized as let a thou-
sand flowers bloom, which proved to be problematic since ’people who don’t know where they are 
going usually end up somewhere else’25. The initial idea of localised change following the develop-
ment trajectory of the ICT sector was replaced with a more chaotic framework. The goals of DDN con-
tained a lot of radical-change-like rhetoric. The winner projects within the IT industry theme included 
a mix of radical as well as incremental change oriented projects in many different sectors, and at dif-
ferent levels. But the large and ‘high profiled’ radical-change-like projects have not been realised at a 
sufficient scale. From an ICT industry perspective DDN appears to have been too broadly formulated 
– the effects to have been too scattered. 
DDN was supposed to make the ICT environment in North Jutland stronger and better equipped to 
be an IT lighthouse of an international standard. The profile of DDN program when it was initiated, 
was however much softer and broader than proposed by the Minister, mainly targeting the public 
sector and many widespread smaller projects. The profile became broadly user-orientated, instead of 
oriented towards industrial R&D and innovation and public research, which at no surprise affected 
the profile of the program significantly.  
It appears on the other hand fair to state, that there has been a series of positive results from DDN 
in a business development context. There are several success stories of small and medium sized local 
IT service firms who have benefited from the program, and many projects where the participation has 
been positive for the participants, but with no significant impact on the development of the ICT sector 
                                                          
25 Another phrase related to the lack of a clear specified goal in DDN is ‘all roads are right if you have no destination’ (Alice in 
Wonderland). 
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in North Jutland per se, at least so far. DDN has created a focus on the ICT sector in the region and has 
represented a certain commercial value. The program seems to have created many networks between 
and among firms and public organization – often brilliantly catalysed by the IT Lighthouse Secretariat 
- that may contribute to the future development perspectives for the ICT sector in North Jutland. 
Whether the effect will be higher than a more narrow Keynesian multiplier effect is hard to tell yet 
and the overall and lasting effects on the region remain still to be seen. 
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